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4. No sheriff or constable inventoried tenants' personal 
property or stored it. 
5. After the January 20 order was issued, landlords refused 
to release personal property and prescriptive medicine belonging to 
tenants' minor children. 
6. By order of January 27, 1995, the court amended its prior 
order and permitted tenants to retrieve a small portion of the 
personal property belonging to their minor children. (R. 018) a 
7. By written notice on February 21, 1995, tenants requested 
that landlords relinquish their personal property, pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-36-10.5(4)(b)(i). (R. 021) 
8. Landlords refused to release any property. 
9. On April 21, 1995, the court denied tenants' motion for 
relief from judgment ruling that " . . . the contract provisions 
regarding tenants' property shall apply. . . ." (R. 024) Landlords 
still hold tenants' property. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY DECLARING A CONTRACTUAL LIEN WAS 
CREATED BY THE BUTTERS-JACKSON LEASE, SIGNIFICANTLY 
DEPARTED FROM ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AS THE LEASE 
LANGUAGE DID NOT CREATE A CONTRACTUAL LIEN. 
The Utah Court of appeals erred in finding that the Butters-
Jackson lease contained a contractual lien on all of the tenants' 
personal property to secure payment of rent. While correct in 
citing Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda. ,N.V. , 663 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 
1983) for the proposition that parties may by contract establish a 
lien to secure payment of rent, that case held that a contractual 
lien agreement must: (1) "identify the property to be charged, and 
(2) make clear that the lien is to secure payment of the debt in 
question." The Court then cited a number of cases as examples; 
however, each of them specifically and expressly provides that a 
"lien" is granted in some property. This actually formed the basis 
for the holding in that case: no contractual lien existed where the 
lease simply said that if the tenant was in defaultf all of their 
property became the landlord's. This language is similar to the 
present case, where the landlords, with the blessing of the trial 
court, have seized and held all of the tenants' property and can 
presumably sell or retain it. Citizens Bank requires the opposite 
result here. 
Other cases have held that the language creating a lien must 
state clearly an intention to do so and some have required "strict 
proof" of such an intention to create a lien. See Cherno v. Dutch 
American Mercantile Corporation, 353 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1965); 
Wellbro Building Company v. McConnico, 421 P.2d 837, 839 (Ok. 
1966): 
In order that a lien may be created by a contract, 
express or implied, it is generally necessary that the 
5 
Utah Code § 70A-9-105(l)(1). In this case the only document that 
could be a security agreement is the lease• Therefore, that lease 
must be reviewed to determine whether it meets all the requirements 
of a security agreement under Article 9.3 
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the "creates or provides 
for" terminology of Utah Code § 70A-9-105 as requiring "language 
specifically granting a security interest in collateral." 
Pontchartrain State Bank, 684 F.2d at 706. 
There is no language in the Butters-Jackson lease which comes 
close to satisfying the requirements of Article 9 for the creation 
of a security interest. The words "grants," "security interest" or 
"security agreement" do not appear anywhere in the lease. The 
reason for this is simple: the parties never intended to create an 
Article 9 security agreement. If the parties did not so intend, 
the court should not create such an agreement by supplying missing 
3
 The Tenth Circuit has noted that traditionally a security 
agreement is contained in a separate security instrument. However, 
some courts have construed other documents, such as promissory 
notes or financing statements, as security agreements if they 
otherwise satisfy the requirements of Article 9 and contain 
language creating or providing for a security interest. 
(Citations omitted). 
Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 
1982). 
8 
I 'ins or by liberally interpreting the language of the lease so as 
iii l i inl .i ii-MM.n. i 1 V i'u\ t^eme^l 
2. No enforceable security agreement exists because the 
description of the property is inadequate. 
Even assuming arguendo that the language passes Lhu Ulan L'UUU 
^ A • s ~ l • : granting a secur i 1 y i nterest „ i t t:ai. .1. v 11 
Cc >i1*- « MIIA -'I Ml I I'll i s s p r t i n i ' It 
Article 9 provides, relevant part, that a security interest, LJJ 
not enforceable unless three elements exist: 
jaj the collateral is in the possession of the secured 
party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a 
security agreement which contains a description ~£ the 
collateral . . .; 
(b) value has been given; and 
(cv *"v~ debtor has rights in u~ cell a t r»r c*"! , 
Utah Code ^ ?0A * enants had rights in 
the < iii I 
given, » L,^ L * I * » tequLrement that
 P^;o „a ai; - rxsurmountable 
obstacle ease ; eated ^ecuir-y agreement. 
I' I I N i , i 
pursuant . agreement ueitsL. scitis^y Utah Code ",1 Oil 
203(1) (a) the lease must contai ^ descriptior /it the collateral 
t l i d II! 
4
 ft,t least In the property that the tenants owned d/L * :A-
inception of the lease. The problem of an apparent grant of a 
security interest in as yet unacquired items, in violation r>f i-h*» 
UCC, is discussed later in this section. 
9 
The designation of the collateral as "furniture, fixtures and 
personal property" is not a sufficient description for Article 9 
purposes. Utah Code § 70A-9-110 provides: 
For the purposes of this chapter any description of 
personal property or, except as otherwise required by 
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the 
contents of a financing statement, real estate is 
sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably 
identifies what is described. 
By its own terms this definition precludes an argument that the 
term "personal property" is a sufficient description of collateral. 
By using the phrase "any description of personal property" as the 
opening premise of Section 9-110, the drafters of Article 9 were 
declaring that personal property must be described in a security 
agreement. Otherwise, the section is illogical. 
There is virtually uniform agreement in the case law that the 
term "personal property" is insufficient for describing collateral 
in a security agreement. In In re Boogie Enterprises, Inc.. 866 
F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989) the court reviewed whether a 
reference to "personal property" in a financing statement5 was 
5
 A financing statement is used to perfect a security 
interest created by a security agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-302. 
A financing statement is sufficient if, among other things, it 
"contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the 
items, of collateral." Utah Code § 70A-9-402(l) . As discussed in 
First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Montana, 721 P.2d 
1270, 1273 (Mont. 1986), the written description of collateral 
serves different purposes in the security agreement and the 
financing statement. 
10 
sufficient to perfect a security interest in settlement proceeds. 
The court held that it did not, concluding: 
The weight of authority indicates that financing 
statements under the Uniform Commercial Code must 
describe collateral with greater precision than that 
furnished by the term "personal property." 
A number of other courts have reached the same conclusion: See, In 
re Fucrua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972) (the phrase "all 
personal property" was insufficient to perfect a security interest 
in livestock, feed, and farming equipment); In re H.L. Bennett, 588 
F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1978) (the phrase "all assets as contained in 
the security agreement" was too vague to satisfy §9-402); Lehigh 
Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Georgia, 389 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. App. 
1989)(the phrase "all personal property" failed to indicate the 
types or describe the items of collateral in which a security 
interest was taken); Becker v. Bank of Barron, 53 B.R. 450 (W.D. 
Wise. 1985)(the phrase "all farm personal property" approached the 
"super-generic" and did not reasonably identify the collateral); 
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Halberstadt, 425 N.W. 2d 429 (la. App. 
1988). 
Because of the differing purposes, it is generally agreed that 
the description of collateral requirement for security agreements 
is stricter than for financing statements. Landen v. PCA of 
Midlands. 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Woodward, 675 P.2d 
1007, 1010 (N.M. App. 1983)("Because the security agreement 
identifies the items of collateral, greater particularity is 
required than in the financing statement."). 
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The In re Boogie court concluded: 
We agree with the analysis of those courts and of 
Professor Gilmore. Section 70A-9-402's requirement of 
identification by "types" or "items" obliges the drafter 
of a financing statement to designate the collateral for 
a loan with greater specificity than the language 
"personal property" provides. "Personal property" 
encompasses all of the items—including general 
intangibles, among others—covered by the division of the 
Code regulating secured transactions. (Citation 
omitted) . The term refers to essentially everything that 
a creditor can perfect an interest in pursuant to the 
Code. "Personal property" cannot satisfy § 9402 's 
requirement of identification of assets by "types" or 
"items" because "personal property" refers to no more and 
no less than every kind of collateral perfectible under 
the statute. 
If the language "personal property" were sufficient 
to perfect a security interest, creditors would never 
need to use any other language to designate collateral. 
(Emphasis in the original). 
In re Boogie Enterprises, 866 F.2d at 1174-75. Given their 
different purposesf and the generally more lenient approach to 
language describing collateral in a financing statement, the 
court's condemnation of the term "personal property" supports a 
fortiori the rejection of "personal property" as a sufficient term 
for describing collateral in a security agreement. 
Related to the issue of a sufficient description of the 
collateral under § 9-203 is the issue of after-acquired property. 
Article 9 permits the parties to secure an obligation by after-
acquired collateral but that agreement must be stated in the 
agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-204. In this case, there is no such 
statement in the lease, yet the trial court, and the Court of 
12 
Appeals, allowed the landlord to seize and hold all property in 
possession of the tenants at the end of the lease, without any 
concern about whether some or all of the property allegedly pledged 
to secure the rent was even present or in the possession of the 
tenants at the outset of the lease. 
It should be clear that questions about what property was 
after-acquired cannot be answered, because the language which the 
court found to create a security interest is simply too broad and 
nondescriptive. Certiorari should be granted because the 
acceptance of lease terms "furniture, fixtures and personal 
property" as satisfying § 9-203 plays havoc with well-established 
principles of law developed under Article 9 and gives a blank check 
to landlords which could be easily abused to the detriment of 
innocent tenants. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY DECLARING A SECURITY INTEREST 
WAS CREATED BY THE BUTTERS-JACKSON LEASE, ENFORCED AN 
UNCONSCIONABLE LEASE TERM. 
The UCC at Utah Code §70A-2-302 prohibits unconscionable terms 
in a contract. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
unconscionability includes the absence of a meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Bekins Bar V Ranch 
v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
13 
The tenants signed the landlords' lease during a severe 
housing shortage. At the time in question, there was a severe 
shortage of available housing in the Ogden, Weber County area. The 
tenants had no choice regarding what terms would be included in the 
lease because of the tight housing market and the form contract 
that was provided. The subject paragraph was just another of a 
typical boiler-plate, closely printed lease agreement that favored 
the owner. For example, the lease was for nine months and 21 days, 
yet the owner, in addition to holding the tenants' personal 
property for nonpayment of rent or other charges, could terminate 
the lease, for any reason, " . . . with 10 days written 
notice . . . ." 
To claim that the tenants had a meaningful choice in signing 
a lease that contained the subject clause during a tight housing 
market is to strip Bekins Bar V of its intended meaning. Jackson 
had no meaningful choice when she affixed her signature on the 
Butters lease. The subject clause contained in the lease should, 
therefore, be declared unconscionable. Certiorari should be 
granted because the Court of Appeals has enforced an unconscionable 
lease term and has therefore sanctioned an unconscionable result. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ENFORCING AN UNINTENDED SECURITY 
AGREEMENT IN THE LEASE, WHICH ALLOWS THE SEIZURE OF 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS, VIOLATES IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY 
OBJECTIVES. 
14 
In P.H. v, Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991), the court 
allowed waiver of the implied warranty of habitability only with a 
separate signed disclosure, requiring an express waiver for public 
policy reasons. The same should be true here. Before a tenant 
gives up rights to personal property, including exempt property, it 
seems reasonable that such waiver be express, clear, separately 
signed, if not barred altogether. Here there is simply no 
indication that such a waiver was intended at all, yet the Court of 
Appeals enforced it, allowing landlord to seize and hold all of 
tenants' property, solely based on the "contractual lien." This 
would seem to violate the public policy set forth in P.H. v. 
Oliver. 
Another indicator of the "wrong road" the Court of Appeals 
decision leads to is found in the regulations of the Federal Trade 
Commission. The FTC's Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit 
Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4), prohibits non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interests in consumers' household goods. 
This regulation declares it an unfair act or practice for a lender 
or retail seller directly or indirectly to take or receive from a 
consumer an obligation that: 
constitutes or contains a nonpossessory security interest 
in household goods other than a purchase money security 
interest. 
15 
Household goods includes: "clothing, furniture, appliances, 
one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, 
and personal effects (including wedding rings) of the consumer and 
his or her dependents . . ."16 C.F.R. § 444.l(i). These are 
exactly the kind of items that were seized and held with the lower 
court's blessing here. While the FTC Rule applies to finance 
companies, credit unions, retailers and others, it does not 
directly apply to landlords. The policy objectives it set out to 
achieve are directly impacted here, however. As one treatise put 
While the collateral has little economic value as 
collateral, the FTC has found that the threat of 
repossession . . . of such goods provides creditors with 
a powerful psychological lever. In fact, the FTC claimed 
in the early 1980's that threats of repossession of 
household goods security may have been the single most 
common form of creditor harassment. 
. . . The FTC has found that these threats cause great 
emotional suffering, anxiety, guilt and distress, leading 
to illness and strain on family relations. . . . 
National Consumer Law Center, Repossessions and Foreclosures 
(3d ed. 1995), at 100. The public policy should lead to a 
prohibition or strict reading of similar clauses in Utah leases, 
not the blanket approval the Court of Appeals gave such clauses in 
its initial opinion. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
By finding a contractual lien and an unintended security 
interest, the Court of Appeals departed both from recognized UCC 
law and Utah public policy concerning leases. In addition to 
resolving an issue that has great public importance in residential 
leases and providing a seeming end-run around a relatively new 
statute, these issues were not briefed or argued. Certiorari 
should be granted to argue these issues. While a valid intentional 
security agreement and contractual lien may be included in a lease, 
the Court of Appeals broad, sweeping approval of the vague and 
unintended clause here will result in frequent seizures of tenants' 
property, increased litigation around such clauses and seizures, 
failure to follow the eviction statute and a bad public policy 
which could extend to UCC cases. Certiorari should be granted to 
fully develop and resolve these issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^S day of J„ fy 
1996. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
MARTIN S. BfAUSTfilN 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that mailed (2) copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to: C. E. BUTTERS 
OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se Plaintiffs/Appellees, 1255 E. 2925 N., 
North Ogden, Utah 84414 on this ?.vS day of s/^fy 
1996. 
MARTIN S. BLAUSTEIN 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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A P P E N D I X 
C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS 
1255 E 2925 N 
NORTH OGDEN UTAH 84414 
la«i ?fi !0 .- AH ::: 
ORDER* OF RESTITUTION 
. > ,A . . • — • — 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
PLAINTIFF (OWNER) C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS 
VS 
ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION 
CASE NO. 
940008531 CV 
) 
) 
DEFENDANTS (TENANTS) TINA JACKSON AND KELLY NORTON) 
830 24TH 
OGDEN UTAH 
MOTION 
THE OWNER AND PLAINTIFF WENT TO TRIAL. OWNER HAS BEEN GRANTED 
JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S NAMED ABOVE. THE OWNER'S RIGHT 
TO IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION OF THE PREMISES AND POSSESSION OF 
DEFENDANT(S) PROPERTY AT THE PREMISES WAS FOUND. 
DATED THIS /<* DAY OF ~Tj>.rJL> 1995 
Sw'fe '' 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1 ) THAT POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AT LISTED FOR THE DEFENDANT 
NAMED ABOVE (830 24TH ST) BE DELIVERED TO THE OWNER, AND THAT THE 
RENTER(S), AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY EROM THE 
RENTER(S) BE REMOVED FROM THESE PREMISES. D^€^<^^~ 
2) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT ALL-SEN52Si S) ' PERSONAL 
PROPERTY BE LEFT AT THE PREMISES. 
3) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT THE THREE DAY WAITING 
PERIOD IS HEREBY WAIVED. THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE IS HEREBY 
DIRECTED TO EXECUTE THIS ORDER OF RESTITUTION IMMEDIATELY. 
DATED THIS c2D DAY 1995 
APPENDIX 1 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Martin S. Blaustein, #3993 
Attorney for Defendants 
550 - 24th Street, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-9431 
(WATS) 1-800-662-2538 
(FAX) (801) 394-9434 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTER BUTTERS, * 
* AMENDED ORDER 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
v. * 
TINA JACKSON and * 
KELLY NORTON, * Judge: Pamela G. Heffernan 
* 
Defendants. * Civil No. 94-CV-853J 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on 
Defendants' Motion for Immediate Hearing on January 27, 1995 at the 
hour of 9:00 a.m. The Defendants appeared in person and was 
represented by counsel, Martin S. Blaustein. The Plaintiff did not 
appear in person, nor was represented by counsel. Defendants' 
counsel mailed a copy of the motion on January 23, 1995. The 
Plaintiff, according to the clerk of the court, called from Idaho, 
claiming he did not receive the motion until January 26, 1995. 
The court having heard the Defendants' concern amends the 
prior order as follows: 
0!8 
APPENDIX 2 
C.E, Butters v. Jackson, et al< 
Amended Order 
Civil No- 94-CV-853 J
"'
V
'
7
 4io?H>i 
O R D E R - * r 0 : c - , . . 
1. The children's prescriptive medication shall be promptly 
returned to Defendants• 
2. The children's clothing, shall be promptly returned. 
This shall include the children's bedding, blankets, pillows and 
sheets. 
3. The children's school books and materials shall be 
promptly returned. This includes all materials related to the 
children's education. 
4. The Defendants or Defendants' counsel shall communicate 
directory with the Plaintiff regarding a reasonable time to 
transfer the above property. The Plaintiff shall supervise and be 
present during this process. 
5. All other aspects of the prior order shall remain the 
same. 
DATED this day of 
Date entered: 
PABELA/P'. HEFFERNAN 
Circuix Cdurt Judge 
019 
C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al. 
Amended Order 
Civil No. 94-CV-853 
/«.. ?• 
w
 M i wv. 
CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING 
- •* . ' ^  * 
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER 
was mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this^ r! 
day of January 1995, to the following: * 
C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se 
Plaintiff 
1255 E. 2925 N. 
North Ogden, UT 784414 
Secretary 
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IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
C . E . BUTTERS, 
P l a i n t i f f ( s ) , 
vs . 
TINA JACKSON a n d 
KELLY NORTON, 
D e f e n d a n t ( s ) , 
D E C I S I O N 
Case No.: 94 CV 8531 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
The Court finds that the acceptance of partial payments in 
October, 1994 by Plaintiff was not an act inconsistent with his 
effort to evict the Defendant. The Court takes into account 
specifically that Defendant has not paid any rent from that time 
and had to be evicted involuntarily from the premesis as late as 
January 1995. 
Plaintiff shall submit a judgment as prayed for in the 
complaint for back rent, court costs, and treble damages from the 
date Defendant was served with the 3-Day Notice. 
DATED this ^Z-TZT d aY o f Februarys 
/PAMELA^. HEFFERN&N 
/circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to: 
C.E. Butters 
Plaintiff 
1255 E 2925 N 
N Ogden, UT 844 04, 
dated this 
Martin Blaustien 
Attorney for Defendant 
550 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
day of February, la 
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IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
TINA JACKSON & KELLY NORTON, 
Defendant(s), 
D E C I S I O N 
Case No.: 95 CV 8531 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
The Court has previously ruled that the contract provisions 
regarding Defendant's property shall apply in the event of a 
default on the contract, as is the case. 
All previous orders shall remain in effect and Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment is denied^—^ 
DATED this CL'f day of April, 1995.—>> / 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to: 
C.E & BETTY BUTTERS 
Plaintiff's 
1255 E 2925 N 
N Ogden, UT 844 04 
MARTIN BLAUSTEIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
550 24th Street, Suite 300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
dated this 2 day of April, 1995. 
Depiut^ N 05ur f C l e r k 
APPENDIX 4 
Codc«Co 
Provo, Utah 
Butters v. Jackson 
290 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 15 
3. The Kearls had also argued to the trial court and on 
appeal that an issue of material fact existed regarding 
the location of the twenty-five-foot strip, but conceded 
in oral argument that its location is undisputed. 
4. Bowen may appear to be distinguishable from the 
case at bar because plaintiffs predecessors in interest 
in Bowen had originally obtained a tax title to the land 
from the county. See Bowen v. Olson, 268 P.2d 983, 
983 (Utah 1954). However, that fact is peripheral to 
the court's opinion in Bowen, which focused solely on 
plaintiffs adverse possession theory and specifically 
dealt with the tax requirement of §78-12-12-the very 
same statute involved here. See id. at 984-86. The 
court's analysis did not even mention the original tax 
sale to plaintiffs predecessors in 1943, but addressed 
only whether plaintiffs redemption of the land from 
a preliminary tax sale to the county in 1947 or 1948 
constituted paying taxes for adverse possession 
purposes under §78-12-12. Id. 
5. We are not particularly impressed with this 
analysis. Although, technically, redemption and 
payment of taxes are not the same thing, practically 
speaking, redemption from the preliminary sale to the 
county is nothing more than a late payment. The 
Bowen court seems to have placed inordinate 
importance on this wordplay. Also, as we discuss 
beginning in the next paragraph, the court's policy 
reason for this rule is questionable, especially in this 
case. However, because the operative facts of Bowen 
are on-point with the operative facts of this case, we 
must apply its rule. 
The policy underlying the Bowen rule was stated by 
the court as follows: 
[B]y paying taxes on the land a public record is 
made which gives notice to the owner that his 
land is being claimed adversely. This purpose 
cannot be fulfilled if the possessor can wait any 
number of years, even up to the necessary seven, 
and then pay the taxes in one lump sum by 
redeeming. Under such circumstances the owner 
would get no current notice of adverse claims 
against his property, and may not until it is too 
late to do anything about it. 
Bowen, 268 P.2d at 985. 
This notice policy is not entirely compelling for two 
reasons. First, specific to this case, because the Kearls 
were not listed as owners on county records and thus 
were not assessed taxes on either the twenty-five-foot 
strip or the New Hope Property, they would not have 
received notice of adverse claims through payment of 
property taxes by Johnson. Second, generally, those 
purporting to own land—in this case, the Kearls-are 
already "on notice" that they should be paying 
property taxes to maintain their ownership of that 
land. They should know that if they are not properly 
paying property taxes and are not in possession of the 
land someone else—the county or an adverse 
possessor—could be laying claim to their land. 
Although the latter reason may seem to cut against the 
Kearls' claim to the twenty-five-foot strip, it is stated 
only as an example of the weakness of notice as a 
policy basis for requiring timely payment of taxes by 
the adverse claimant during the entire seven-year 
adverse possession period. However, as we observe in 
footnote six, we are more concerned with the strength 
of the Martins' claim, not the weakness of the Kearls' 
claim. Also, other elements of adverse possession are 
more likely to serve the purpose of giving notice in 
any case. 
Two other more sound policy bases for the rule 
may be stated as follows: First, because of the gravity 
of adverse possession claims-wresting title from 
otherwise rightful owners-claimants must strictly 
comply with all requirements. See 10 George W. 
Thompson, Thompson on Real Property §87.01, at 
81-82 (David A. Thomas ed. 1994); Edward L. 
Montgomery, The Adverse Possession of Land Titles 
in Utah, 3 Utah L. Rev. 294, 310 (1953); 2 C.J.S. 
Adverse Possession §5 (1972). This compliance 
includes timely payment of "all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to law," 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1992). And, second, the 
tax payment requirement should not reward "one who 
claims the benefits of ownership without fulfilling his 
obligation to the community of [timely] paying taxes." 
7 Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on 
Real Property 1 1013[2], at 91-68 (1996). 
6. The Martins contend that, because the Kearls did 
not notify the county that the parcel was severed into 
two segments so that the county could separately 
assess the twenty-five-foot strip and because the 
Kearls made no attempt to pay the taxes themselves, 
the Kearls are somehow at fault and foreclosed from 
defending this adverse possession action. However, 
"[p]laintiffs must succeed on the strength of their own 
claim and not alone on the weakness of the 
defendants' claims in order to succeed." Lyman v. 
National Mortgage Bond Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 127, 
320 P.2d 322, 325 (1958). The Kearls failure to show 
they occupied the twenty-five-foot strip or paid taxes 
on it does not "bar their rights to recover the property 
where . . . plaintiffs have failed to establish any valid 
claim or right to the property in themselves," id. 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Defendants (tenants) entered into a written 
agreement with plaintiffs (landlords) to lease 
residential real property. Tenants contend the 
trial court erred by upholding certain provisions 
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of their lease contract in violation of several 
statutes. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
After serving tenants with a three-day notice 
to quit or pay rent, landlords filed a complaint 
for unlawful detainer against tenants, alleging 
nonpayment of rent. A bench trial was held and 
the trial court awarded landlords a judgment for 
back rent, court costs, and treble damages. The 
order of restitution restored landlords to their 
property and ordered tenants removed from the 
premises. The trial court also ordered tenants to 
leave their personal property on the premises as 
required by the lease. 
Tenants moved for an immediate hearing, 
challenging the court's order as it pertained to 
their personal property. At that hearing, the 
court issued an amended order allowing the 
tenants to retrieve their children's prescription 
medicines, clothing, bedding, and educational 
materials. All other aspects of the court's 
original order were upheld. 
Tenants then moved for relief from judgment 
pursuant to rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The motion alleged that the 
trial court's order violated the foliowmg 
statutory provisions: the order of restitution 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10.5 (Supp. 
1995); the lessors' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§38-3-1 and -4 (1994); and the exempt property 
statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§78-23-5, -8, and -11 
(1992). Tenants appeal from the denial of their 
rule 60(b) motion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The denial of a motion to vacate a judgment 
pursuant to rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only 
for an abuse of discretion. Department of Social 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 
1989). 
ANALYSIS 
Tenants argue that the order of restitution 
issued by the trial court improperly denied them 
the opportunity to remove their personal 
property from the leased premises. Further, 
tenants assert that the trial court improperly 
allowed landlords to retain tenants' personal 
property without obtaining a writ of attachment 
and bond. Tenants also allege that at least pan 
of the property retained by landlords was 
property exempt from execution. 
Restitution under Unlawful Detainer 
Utah Code Annotated §78-36-10.5(1) 
provides: "Each order of restitution shall (a) 
direct the defendant 10 vacate the premises, 
remove his personal property, and restore 
possession of the premises to the plaintiff." The 
order of restitution issued by the trial court in 
this case required that "all defendant[s'] personal 
property be left at the premises." Tenants 
therefore claim the trial court's order of 
restitution is contrary to the statute. 
In the instant case, the order of restitution 
statute must be read in conjunction with 
provisions creating lessors' liens. See Jerz v. 
Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 
1991) (holding that potentially conflicting 
legislative acts are to be construed in harmony 
with each other and to avoid conflicts). 
A lessors' lien can be created by statute. Utah 
Code Ann. §38-3-1 (1994) ("Whenever any rent 
shall be due and unpaid under a lease, or the 
lessee is about to remove his property from the 
leased premises, the lessor may have the 
personal property of the lessee which is upon the 
leased premises and subject to such lien attached 
without other ground for such attachment.").1 A 
lessors' lien can also be created by contract. 
Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329 
(Utah 1977) (validating lease term granting 
landlord contractual lien against tenant's 
personal property which was to remain on 
premises until rent paid). Therefore, although 
the order of restitution statute envisions the 
return of personal property to the tenant, it does 
not preclude the creation and enforcement of a 
lessors' lien. To hold otherwise would allow the 
order of restitution statute to destroy or nullify 
the effect of an otherwise valid lessors' lien. 
Statutory and Contractual Liens 
As mentioned, a landlord may obtain an 
interest in a tenant's personal property through 
either a statutory lessors* lien or a lease 
contract. The lessors' lien statute provides that 
a landlord "shall have a lien for rent due upon 
all nonexempt property of the lessee brought or 
kept upon the leased premises." Utah Code Ann. 
§38-3-1 (1994). Section 38-3-4 provides that 
before a landlord may obtain a writ of 
attachment for the property, the landlord must 
file a complaint, with an accompanying affidavit 
and bond. See id. §38-3-4. Tenants claim 
landlords retained their property without 
complying with section 38-3-4. 
However, the statutory lessors' hen, as 
provided in sections 38-3-1 through 38-3-8, is 
separate and distinct from a lien created by 
contract. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg. ,N.V.9 663 
P.2d 56, 57-60 (Utah 1983) (analyzing claims of 
both statutory lien and contractual lien on 
tenants' personal property); Robert S. 
Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and 
Tenant §6.23, at 441-42 (1980) (lessors' 
contractual lien "exists independently of the 
right of distress or a lien conferred by statute"); 
5 Thompson on Real Property 31 (David A. 
Thomas ed. 1994) ("When not prohibited by 
statute, a consensual lien in favor of the landlord 
may exist independently of distraint or statutory 
lien rights.") 
To establish a contractual lien, the contract 
must: "(1) identify the property to be charged, 
and (2) make clear that the lien is to secure 
payment of the debt in question." Citizens Bank, 
663 P.2d at 59. In Citizens Bank, the Utah 
Supreme Court considered, in detail, the 
requirements for a contractual lien. A lease 
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providing that "any unpaid rent would be a lien 
against the lessee's personal property, which 
was not to be removed until all rent was paid," 
was determined to meet the criteria of a 
contractual lien. Id. (citing Frisco Joes, 558 
P.2d at 1329-30). In Citizens Bank, the lease 
provided that the landlord could "reenter the 
premises . . . and take possession of the same 
and all equipment and fixtures therein, and 
thereafter relet the premises or any part thereof 
for the account of the tenant." Id. This did not 
meet the criteria for a contractual lien because it 
did not "state that its purpose is for securing 
rent, nor does it in any way suggest that a 
charge is created against lessee's property from 
which rent may be collected." Id. at 60. 
By comparison, the lease in the instant case 
expressly provides: "Furniture, fixtures and 
personal property of tenant may not be removed 
from the premises until rent or other charges are 
fully paid." The lease satisfies the first prong of 
the Citizens Bank test by identifying the tenants' 
furniture, fixtures, and personal property as the 
property to be charged. The lease also satisfies 
the second prong of the test by providing that 
the described property is to secure payment of 
the rent in that it "may not be removed from the 
premises until rent or other charges are fully 
paid." This language is very similar to that 
found in the contractual lien upheld in Frisco 
Joes. Therefore, the lease agreement in the 
instant case created a contractual lien. 
Because the contractual lien is separate and 
distinct from the statutory lessors' lien, the 
lessor need not follow the unique requirements 
for enforcing a statutory lien. Further, a 
contractual lien is a security interest under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Schoshinski, supra, §6.23, at 443 ("The 
landlord's contractual lien is generally 
considered a chattel mortgage, and as such is a 
'security interest' under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. ").2 Landlords in the 
instant case properly enforced their security 
interest in tenants' personal property as part of 
the unlawful detainer action. 
Exempt Property 
Tenants next assert that landlords should not 
have been allowed to retain property exempt 
from execution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-23-5 and -8. Tenants further contend that 
the exemptions may not be waived pursuant to 
section 78-23-11. 
Section 78-23-11 prohibits the waiver of 
exemptions in favor of unsecured creditors. A 
landlord who is a secured creditor by virtue of 
a contractual lien does not fit that category. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-23-2(8) (1992) ("'Security 
interest' means an interest in property created by 
contract to secure payment or performance of an 
obligation."); WellbroBldg. Co. v. McConnico, 
All P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1966) (holding 
contractual lien in lease creates security 
interest). Utah Code Ann. §78-23-10(2) (1992) 
provides that a security interest in exempt 
property is enforceable. Thus, because we have 
determined that the lease created a security 
interest in landlords' favor, and because a 
security interest in exempt property is 
enforceable, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying tenants' motion to vacate 
the judgment under rule 60(b). 
CONCLUSION 
The lease in this case created a contractual 
lien in the tenants' exempt and nonexempt 
personal property. The lien was a security 
interest and its enforcement in the unlawful 
detainer action was proper. The trial court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying 
tenants' motion for relief from judgment under 
rule 60(b). Affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
1. The statutory lessors' lien would allow the 
breaching tenant to remove exempt property, but the 
nonexempt property would be subject to the lien. Utah 
Code Ann. §38-3-1(1994). 
2. Utah has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-9- 104(b) (1990) provides that 
landlord's liens are excluded from article nine. 
However, in other jurisdictions, UCC 9-104(b) has 
been interpreted as excluding only statutory lessors' 
liens. Schoshinski, supra, §6.23, at 443 n.37. We 
conclude that a contractual lessors' lien is covered by 
article nine. 
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C.E. Butters and Betty 
Butters, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
Tina Jackson and Kelly Norton, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950361-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellants' petition 
for rehearing, filed June 21, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
Kp-day of June, 1996 
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